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ABSTRACT

Employee turnover contributes to lost production, disrupts normal business practices, and is expensive. This literature review examines turnover of three administrator positions: the school superintendent, the executive director of nonprofit agencies, and the chief executive officer of for-profit corporations. The most cited reason for turnover of school superintendents is a negative relationship between the board of education and the superintendent, caused by the board, the superintendent, or by environmental agents. Just as with the superintendent of schools, the most cited reason for executive-director turnover is the relationship with the board of directors. One major difference, however, is a greater likelihood of the executive director to secure another position, or to ready him or herself for another position beyond the one he or she just left. Retirement is the most cited reason for the chief executive officer to leave the for-profit corporation. Succession planning is more for the future and well-being of the corporation than it is for the outgoing chief executive officer. The transition should be done with as little disruption as possible to meet the corporation's needs of forging ahead with their profit goals. An appendix lists the studies used in this review. (Contains 92 references.) (RT)

Running head: ADMINISTRATOR TURNOVER

A Review of the Literature on
Administrator Turnover:
Why they Move on or are Displaced

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Abstract

The purpose of this literature review is to examine the causes of turnover among superintendents of schools, executive directors of nonprofit agencies, and the chief executive officers of for-profit corporations. These top administrator positions, which deal with leadership, decision-making and financial accountability, perform their duties in three very different working milieus.

A Review of the Literature on
Administrator Turnover:
Why they Move on or are Displaced

Employee turnover contributes to lost production (Finnegan, 1990), disrupts normal business practices (Winkler and Janger, 1998) and is quite expensive (Sunoo, 1998). Rinefort and Van Fleet (1998) define turnover as:

The amount of movement of employees in and out of an organization. The turnover rate is defined as the rate at which employees in an organization leave and are replaced by other individuals who are employed by the organization.

Other similar but slightly different measures are accessions or additions to staff and separations consisting of quits, discharges, retirements and deaths. (p. 10)

According to a New York City-based research firm, William M. Mercer, Inc., the cost of replacing *each* employee ranges from \$10,000 to \$30,000 (Sunoo, 1998). Winkler and Janger (1998) peg the number between \$30,000 and \$50,000, while explaining:

Turnover costs include the loss of the contribution of valued performers and the cost of replacing them. These fall into four categories: lost productivity, lost opportunity, recruitment and training. These costs are tangible and easily quantifiable. They are, however, understated. Left unmeasured, for example, are costs related to lost marketplace reputation due to high turnover, loss of credibility with customers because of inexperienced personnel, and the cost of

newcomer mistakes due to inexperience. In extreme cases, lack of experience can lead to safety and health incidents or litigation against the company. (p. 15)

But what about turnover at the top of the organizational chart, be it the superintendent of schools, the executive director of nonprofit agencies, or the chief executive officer of for-profit corporations?

There seems to be evidence that when the top management person leaves, the entire organizational structure is affected, regardless of the professional setting (Brady and Helmich, 1984; Comte and Mihal, 1990; Cuban, 1976a; Drucker, 1990; Herman and Heimovics, 1994; Lee and Milne, 1988; Newman and Alexander, 1985; Wernet and Austin, 1991; Winkler and Janger, 1998). Also, the effects on employees and the organization depend upon what force is initiating the change, be it self-initiated or initiated by the governing body. Friedman and Saul (1991) indicate that board-initiated successions are disruptive to an organization, yet a chief executive officer's voluntary resignation, although disruptive, did not effect key executive staff members leaving the organization.

Clearly, not all turnover is bad. Turnover offers an opportunity for new thinking and new organizational effort, output and accomplishments. Agencies, businesses and school districts, however, should be aware that changing top executives sends a signal to outside sponsors, clientele and patrons. Governing boards should weigh this option because of the potential for reducing the establishment of power in organizations (Harrison, Torres and Kukalis, 1988).

The purpose of this literature review is to examine turnover of three administrator positions: the school superintendent, the executive director of nonprofit agencies and the chief executive officer of for-profit corporations. Although each position is quite different in terms of degrees, certification and management styles, they are also very much related. Some skills that are germane to all three positions are: long range planning, human resource management, fiduciary decisions and public relations, to name a few. The differences lie more in the environment in which they operate and the purpose or the motivation of their positions. School districts, which prepare the young to enter the workforce or to go on to higher education, are vastly different from nonprofit agencies that typically exist to meet a human service need or to accomplish an altruistic mission. Both greatly contrast from corporations which is motivated to make money and increase their market share of the product they manufacture or service they provide.

The Superintendent of Schools

This issue of superintendent turnover is not limited to one section of the country (Dlugosh, 1994; Graser, 1972; Heim and Wilson, 1987; Markello, 1971; Moneith and Hallums, 1989) or to rural school districts (Chance and Capps, 1990, 1992; Grady and Bryant, 1988) or to urban school districts (Cuban, 1976a; Jackson, 1995; Kowalski, 1995; Renchler, 1992; Yee and Cuban, 1996).

The position of school superintendent is one of the more difficult, complicated jobs in the educational profession (Blumberg, 1985; Chapman, 1997; Cuban, 1976b; Jacobson, 1990; Kowalski, 1995; Miner, 1967; Sharp and Walter, 1997; Sullivan-Kowalski, 1976), because most, if not all decisions and meetings, are open to the public

which subject the superintendent to public scrutiny and ridicule, especially during this time of taxpayer revolt. Citizens with political aspirations, declared change agents, and sometimes disgruntled voters and taxpayers who often run for board of education seats (Webster, 1985), could put the superintendent at odds with newly-elected board members (Johnson, 1988). The superintendent of schools must publicly juggle a number of conflicting variables that sometimes lead to disputes with incumbent school board members (Carter and Cunningham, 1997; Cuban, 1988; Lawson, 1991; Lutz and Iannaccone, 1986). Some of these disputes have been traced back to a series of school reforms, generally started after the National Commission on Excellence in Education's report (1983) *A Nation at Risk* warned that the United States educational system was inadequate, while not appropriately teaching the nation's youth. Farrar (1990) argued that these reforms came in three waves: the first, focused on improving student performance; the second, focused on upgrading teacher certification, pay and working conditions; the third, focused on the preparation of school administrators. It is this third school reform effort that has become most contentious for the school superintendent.

Because of deteriorating resources and an increased demand for more and better educational outcomes, the tension between the school board and the superintendent has become more volatile (Kowalski, 1995). Giles and Giles (1990a) found that over a six-year period in California, a staggering 75% of superintendent turnover was attributable to disharmonious board relations.

Danzberger and Usdan (1994) argue that the present system of a school board carrying out local educational practices through delegated state authority has changed

very little since the early 20th century. Educational reformers agree that meaningful educational change is more likely to be successful when pursued at the local school board level, which is generally supported by the community and the professional educators, including the superintendents (Kowalski, 1995). Seemingly, however, these good educational policies and reforms are at the success or failure of the relationship held between the board of education and the superintendent. Blumberg (1985) notes that:

It is not surprising that superintendents have tended to think of the school board in terms of individual members rather than as a group. Both the superintendent's professional reputation and his personal welfare depend greatly on his ability to influence its decisions. Further, it is primarily through the one-on-one linkage between superintendent and school board member that attempts to influence take place. There is nothing underhanded about this. It is an accepted and legitimate part of the workings of our political institutions--and lest there be [sic] any misunderstandings, school boards definitely are political institutions. (pp. 76-77)

Therefore, the superintendent's relationship with the board is critical, not just for educating the district's students, but also for job security of the superintendent (Sharp, 1994). Cuban (1988) states that "...the central image [of a superintendent] is negotiator-statesman which is one of politics" (p. 116). Since superintendents must attempt to establish positive relationships with all board members, Kowalski (1995) warns that even positive relations cultivated over several years may be ruined by "a misconstrued comment, the failure to accommodate the request for a favor, or the unwillingness to support a particular position on a controversial policy matter" (p. 45). Inevitably, the

superintendent and the school board are always in an uneasy conflict with one another (Blumberg, 1985; Carter and Cunningham, 1997; Chance and Capps, 1990, 1992; Graser, 1972; Johnson, 1988; Kowalski, 1995; Markello, 1971; Renschler, 1992; Sharp and Walter, 1997).

Since this relationship is political, the superintendent's trustfulness and honesty come into play (Achilles, 1997; Blumberg, 1985; Chapman, 1997; Conway and Jacobson, 1990; Dlugosh, 1997; Gordon, 1997; Henry, 1987; Nyberg, 1990; Woods-Scherr, 1997). Bennis (1989) suggests that successful leaders, regardless of what profession or where they are in an organizational hierarchy, need to have the competency he calls management of trust. This ability grows from the leader's capacity to be reliable and constant, which builds a record of support of issues when there are competing factions and pressures upon the leader. In other words, the person making the decision has the confidence and the support of the people for whom he or she is making the decision (Dlugosh). Even if a number of people publicly disagree with the superintendent of schools over some emotional problem, such as the promotion of a bond issue or an increase in school taxes, there is a tendency to respect the honesty of the superintendent. When a superintendent is honest, forthright and assertive, the board of education tends to inspire trust with the superintendent and helps to build his or her credibility. Blumberg states that "the lack of those two ingredients to the relationship--trust and credibility--makes for an untenable situation" (p. 81). Eventually this type of circumstance will lead to the superintendent being replaced (Lutz and Innaccone, 1986).

However, there are a number of other reasons why superintendents leave their positions than just board/superintendent relations. Dlugosh (1994), in a study of contributing factors of turnover of school administrators in Nebraska, found that administrators wanted to acquire "better" positions (with usually greater financial reward or higher status in the profession, movement to a larger district), or they wanted to move to a larger community. A few superintendents left because of family pressures, stress, working conditions and school board relations.

Perhaps the most insightful view on turnover, even though it dealt with urban school districts, but could certainly apply to all types of school districts, is David Bennett's 1991 article, titled *Big-City Blues*. Bennett, a former superintendent of schools in Minneapolis, offers the following:

- The political role of the superintendent was often in conflict from what the board of education wanted with what was the right direction or decision for the whole district. This is especially true when a board member is elected not for what's in the best interest of education, rather the "board member behaves like a politician: concerned primarily with getting re-elected or to seek a higher political office." (p. 23)
- The "impossible job" syndrome--when a newly hired superintendent cannot instantly resolve pressing problems of the district and loses favor which causes dissatisfaction from the board of education. The result leads to a short tenure of the superintendent.

- The decline of the missionary zeal for a proper education of urban schoolchildren. Yet, this may be a symptom of the world around us, one where the missionary zeal is lacking in other professions too.
- A scarcity of formal preparation programs for superintendents. There is a lack of college preparatory programs geared toward the urban setting.
- Better opportunities in other, but less troubling, urban school districts. Suburban and rural districts can sometimes "outbid" their urban counterparts because of their stronger funding base.
- Racial relations. "Approximately 75 percent of the enrollment of the nation's 25 largest school districts are students of color...big city superintendents who are white males daily experience some challenge to their authority to lead the district, simply on the basis of race." (p. 24)
- Conflicting roles of the superintendent, juxtaposed with the school boards and the state education department. The state education department defines almost everything regarding public policy, leaving the urban school boards in constant conflict with the state and the administration.

An often-cited study of factors that undermine strong relationships with the board of education was published by Grady and Bryant (1991). They define the causes of poor relations, which ultimately cause the superintendent to turnover, into the following types:

- Family and friends of board members. Difficulties arose for favorable or unfavorable treatment of children, relatives of board members, their friends, or powerful community members.

- Employing relatives and friends of board members. This included hiring, firing, undesirable working conditions, undesirable job assignments of relatives of board members, their friends, or powerful community members.
- The incorrect interpretations of board members' roles. These include minor things such as arranging facility use, to the more serious matters of assessing staff, job appointments, communicating with staff about confidential matters, confronting staff about personal issues, awarding contracts, making decisions based upon outside advisement, approving all of the superintendent's decisions and micro-management.
- Election of board members with personal agendas. When a member of the community campaigns on one issue, usually one that has rankled the person, this causes a great deal of dissention, antagonism and arguments at every public and private board meeting.
- The lack of board support. When the board of education does not support the superintendent's recommendation, after a while, this effects in a negative way, the length of time the superintendent will be working at that district.
- The board's inability to police itself. When the board make-up creates stagnation, vacillation, and instability, the effect is that they will not function as a cohesive group.
- The hiring and firing of an athletic coach often hit nerves within the school district in a very difficult manner. Winning and losing, and perceived

preferential treatment of some students are often in conflict with what is right for the schoolchildren.

- Community groups and organizations apply pressure to the board and to the superintendent over one issue, such as cutting taxes. A single issue has multiple consequences that need to be considered, and focused groups are only concerned with the resolution of their conflict.
- The actions of individual board members could shorten the tenure of the superintendent. Holding private meetings outside the regular board meetings and conducting unsolicited opinions in the community are extremely disruptive to the board/superintendent relationship.
- Actions of the school employees sometimes cause a problem for the superintendent, even though he had nothing to do with a particular incident, he or she is still held accountable.
- The superintendent contract often is an emotional issue for both the school board and the superintendent. When to renew the contract, lengthening it and appropriate compensation all come into play for both sides.
- The superintendent's behavior may also effect how the board feels about the incumbent. Personal but legal behavior may be in direct conflict with how the board views the superintendent's role in the community.

In regard to the issue of retirement, Giles and Giles (1990b) found that in analyzing California superintendent turnover, a small number of superintendents vacated their

position each year due to retirement. These included both voluntary retirements and mandated retirements.

From the literature reviewed, the most cited reason that caused turnover of the superintendent of schools was the negative relationship between the board of education and the superintendent. These negative relations were caused by a number of different factors, some caused by the board, some caused by the superintendent and others caused by environmental agents.

The Executive Director of Nonprofit Organizations

All nonprofit organizations exist to meet a human service need, have altruistic motives or are geared to accomplish a charitable or interest purpose (Carver, 1990; James, 1987; Massarsky, 1994). Nonprofit agencies function under strict state and federal policies of governance, finance and reporting (Anthony and Young, 1994; Kennedy, 1991). Nonprofit agencies are exempt from most federal and state taxes (i.e., sales tax on the purchase of most items). Yet, taxes, such as FICA are required to be paid by the organization. A board of directors governs the nonprofit agency, which is usually comprised of people who are interested in the cause the organization represents. The primary purpose of the board includes setting policy, establishing organizational goals and evaluating the results, hiring and replacing the executive director, and acting as custodians of the agency's assets (Yarrow, 1989). Typically, depending upon the size of the organization and its mission for existence, the board hires an executive director, who has delegated to him or her, the day-to-day operations of the organization (Carver, 1997; Middleton, 1987).

The job qualifications of the executive director depend upon the mission of the organization. An executive director does not necessarily need to have a degree, any certification or advanced training. As Daniels (1988) notes:

[CEOs] come from very diverse backgrounds and serve different types of organizations. They range from secretaries promoted up from handmaiden status to eminent former college presidents; and their responsibilities range from personal service for a family board dispensing funds of a few hundred thousand a year, to large national and international foundations that give millions away.
(p. 120)

The experience pattern of a select group of nonprofit organizations found that the executive directors' career fell into one of four categories: an influential or well-known figure from academic administration, business, or scientific research who would add distinction or notoriety to the job or the nonprofit; a successful young professional in mid-career who may find the executive director's job as a stepping stone or a permanently satisfactory career improvement; the person in a small nonprofit whose status is ambiguous and whose possibilities for promotion or further mobility are unclear or limited; and, the businessperson near or after retirement who provides an aura of stability, finds the executive director job as being interesting and also less taxing than his or her former career (Daniels, 1988).

Due to the diversity of an executive director's qualifications and background, along with the arguably loose accountability of the nonprofit sector (Gelatt, 1992), a general perception exists that these organizations survive solely on donations from the

public and are a wasteful use of tax dollars. A misconception persists that nonprofit agencies are under-managed and are accountable to no governmental or public entity (Hay, 1990).

The opposite is true of course. While the executive director is accountable to the board of directors, the board members are ultimately responsible for the image, quality services, and all legal matters and financial transactions (Carver, 1990; Douglas, 1987; Gelatt, 1992; Hall, 1987; Kluger and Baker, 1994; Middleton, 1987; Vladeck, 1988).

John Carver (1997), a leading consultant and author regarding nonprofit agencies argues that the organization should define the job of the executive director as:

To ensure the (1) achievement of a reasonable interpretation of the organizational results, beneficiary, and cost of those results as described in the board's ends policies, and (2) avoidance of a reasonable interpretation of the unacceptable conditions and actions described in the board's executive limitations policies.
(p. 2)

Carver (1997) goes on to say:

The executive director is empowered to make all decisions, create all policies, and authorize all engagements that, upon board request, he or she can demonstrate to be consistent with a reasonable interpretation the board's ends and executive limitation. (p. 3)

Board's ends (acceptable, agreed upon results) and executive limitations (acceptable, agreed upon areas of the executive director's decision-making latitude) are what define the board/executive relationship (Carver, 1990). This relationship, with the executive

director and the board of directors, is just as important with nonprofit agencies as it is with the superintendent of schools and the board of education.

The most cited variable about what causes executive director turnover is the relationship with the board of directors (Carver, 1990; Gelatt, 1992; Hay, 1990; Herman and Heimovics, 1994; Kluger and Baker, 1994), and particularly the board chairman (Vladeck, 1988).

Regarding this interesting relationship, Vladeck (1988), offers the following:

The role of chair is certainly quite pivotal, which is remarkable when one remembers that most nonprofit board chairs are part-time, uncompensated volunteers for whom the nonprofit is something quite different from their primary professional or occupational commitment. In many nonprofits, the chair *is* the board for all practical intents and purposes--other members of the board are controlled by, or defer to, him or her, or really are not terribly interested... The relationship between board chair and chief salaried officer is thus the single most important relationship within a nonprofit. (pp. 73-74)

Since relationships are so important for the longevity of the executive director in a particular nonprofit agency, researchers have looked at the position in a way to prevent turnover from occurring (Carver, 1990, 1997; Herman and Heimovics, 1994; Kennedy, 1991; Kluger and Baker, 1994; Martin, 1993; Mehr, 1980, 1983; Temkin, 1994; Wernet, and Austin, 1991; Young, 1987). Two of the most important are entrepreneurial thinking (Young) and creating relationships of commitment (Temkin).

Young (1987), defines entrepreneurial as:

The organizing and catalytic effort responsible for bringing about new economic activity (new goods or services) or the provisions of these products in some innovative way...Entrepreneurship requires the melding of ideas and opportunities with resources and overcoming whatever constraints lie between the conception and the successful implementation of a project. (p. 168)

Young (1985) also argues that in contrast, executive leadership, the traditional way of managing a nonprofit entity, deals with the various routine or day-to-day aspects of organizational life. Entrepreneurial leadership will assist with keeping an agency fresh, energetic and to always be on the lookout for a new need to be met.

Temkin (1994) argues that the modern nonprofit agency needs a new kind of leader. A leader who can "inspire and motivate, state clearly what an organization stands for--its values, standards, code of conduct--and explain why the organization does what it does and why that's important" (p. 35). In order to accomplish this, she suggests six ways to create relationships of commitment:

- Set goals. This allows for a codified vision, makes the tasks real and gives them meaning for the entire organization and the board of directors.
- Evaluate progress. Key staff and board members need to meet periodically to assess where the agency stands in the accomplishment of its goals.
- Communicate trust and respect. Leaders must communicate that fact that they trust and respect their workers, and listen critically to what people are saying.
- Encourage fun. People forget the need for fun, which is essential to make all the effort seem worthwhile.

- Develop future leadership. The organization must see that leaders promote and train others to assume the leadership position. Not necessary for succession, but for the development of the key executive staff for possible job openings in other nonprofit agencies.

Gelatt (1992) suggests that the executive director should always be conscious of building and preparing to move on to another career, receiving more education, looking for opportunities to advance to a larger organization and being cautious about burnout.

Just as with the superintendent of schools, the most cited reason for executive director turnover was the relationship with the board of directors. One major difference, however, was the notion of the executive director to secure another position or to ready himself or herself for another position beyond the one he or she just left.

The Chief Executive Officer of For-Profit Corporations

Carver (1990) defines for-profit companies as, "business corporations engage[d] in trade in order to produce a return for stockholders. These companies ordinarily compete in a market that is more or less free" (p. 4). The motivation differs a great deal from that of the school district and the nonprofit organization. Obviously, then, the chief executive officer of the for-profit company is motivated by profits and expectations of profitability to his or her board of directors. There is a widely held common belief that turnover of the chief executive officer at a for-profit corporation is due to poor performance (Healy, 1994). While this may be partially true, there is evidence to suggest that, as Comte and Mihal (1990) state, "poor performance and CEO turnover may be associated, but one does not necessarily cause the other" (p. 47). Vancil (1987) found

that only 10 percent of chief executive officer turnover was related to poor performance. However, these findings greatly contradict Puffer and Weintrop's (1991) study of corporate performance and turnover, where they found that turnover of the chief executive officer occurs when reported annual earnings per share fell short of expectations. The expectations of the board of directors and the chief executive officer differ because the goals of each party do not automatically coincide (Puffer and Weintrop). Thus, possibly shortening the chief executive officer's tenure.

According to agency theory (Eisenhart, 1989), a conflict of interest can arise because the financial objectives of the board of directors and that of the corporation, may be different from the chief executive officer. Traditionally, the chief executive officer and his or her management team are delegated the day-to-day operations of the corporation, and decisions that are made in the short term could have financial and job security consequences in the long term. As Puffer and Wintrop (1991) note:

The board is primarily interested in increasing shareholder wealth by maximizing stock prices, whereas the CEO is motivated by self-interest and an increase in personal wealth through compensation and nonpecuniary benefits. The board is then faced with finding ways of ensuring that the CEO will act in the shareholders' interest. Compensation contracts and dismissals are mechanics for controlling the CEO's actions and aligning the CEO's and shareholder's interests.

(p. 2)

The relationship between the chief executive officer and the board of directors is extremely important. As Larry Fouraker, former Dean of the Harvard Business School,

states (in Vancil, 1987), "shared objectives and mutual respect between the CEO and the board of directors is the crucial element. If that exists, the board can confidently allow the CEO to organize his own succession process" (p. 29). Smooth succession, seemingly, is the goal for the for-profit corporation to maintain its profitability and stability.

A chief executive officer may survive volatile stock prices and the organization's profitability, as long as the chief executive officer and the board of directors share in the financial stability goals of the company (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988). In fact, as the stock market ebbs and flows, the market share and profitability of corporations rise and fall over time, Lee and Milne (1988), argue that the chief executive officer's tenure is more stable than is commonly believed:

The turnover analysis present indicates that during the 10-year period [1976-1985] in our study, 41 percent of the companies changed CEO once. More than 42 percent of the companies did not change their CEO for the 10-year period. That nearly half of the *Fortune* 500 companies had the same CEO for at least 10 years was a surprise. Only a very small fraction of the companies changed CEO more than twice during the 10-year period. (p. 27)

Why then do chief executive officers of for-profit corporations leave their current position?

The early 1990's was a time when turnover of the chief executive officer was commonplace, making big headlines at major corporations, including American Express, IBM, Apple Computer, Digital Equipment, Eastman Kodak, General Motors and Westinghouse, to name a few; these occurrences suggested a time of chief executive

officer instability. Yet, Osterman (1996), found that only one in ten of the chief executive officers annually left the 1,000 companies ranked largest by market capitalization from 1988 to 1992. Most of these departures were contributed to voluntary retirements.

Clearly, the most frequent reason why chief executive officers of for-profit corporations leave their positions is due to retirement (A. Bennett, 1990; Brady and Helmich, 1984; Comte and Mihal, 1990; Healy, 1994; Horton, 1992; Osterman, 1996; Vancil, 1987; Warner et al, 1988; Weisback, 1988). These included both voluntary and mandated retirements. Some mandated retirements included compulsory retirement age policies at a few corporations.

Frequently, once the chief executive officer leaves his or her position, he or she assumes a role on the board of directors, sometimes including the chairman of the board (Vancil, 1987) who, more than likely would be involved in the search process of hiring his or her predecessor. Even though the chief executive officer has left his seat, he or she has not vacated their influence over the company.

Regarding the turnover of the chief executive officer position in for-profit corporations, Stieglitz (1985), notes the following:

The former CEO emerges as the non-executive chairman, or the chairman of a major board committee, or just a board member in most U.S. and non-U.S. companies--unless, of course, his departure was somewhat sudden and involuntary. Even in such cases he may be retained as a consultant, available if called. It is a relatively rare CEO who is willing to make a sharp and total break

from any formal tie with the company he has headed. And, generally, it is the board and the organization--rather than the new CEO--that wants to avail himself of his experience and judgement by keeping the individual as a board member. (p. 29)

Seemingly, then, succession planning for the for-profit corporations is a sane, thought out process (Brady and Helmich, 1984; Horton, 1992; Jay, 1994; Moulton and Fickel, 1993; Sonnenfeld, 1988; Vancil, 1987), that has very few surprises for the current management team and keeps the organization on track for making money for the stockholders (Gabarro, 1988).

Brady and Helmich (1984) state that, "the timing of CEO succession, origin of the successor, and the needs of the successor all come into play within a structural, technological, and environmental framework to bring about predictable organizational outcomes" (p.12). Steiglitz (1985), asked 241 chief executive officers to rate their future successor's needed qualities; he found the following:

- Personal Leadership Style. The manner in which their successor would lead the people around the new chief executive officer.
- Aggressive Competitive Outlook. The methods by which the future chief executive officer would take on competitors to try and take more of the market share of a particular product.
- Entrepreneurial Flair. The manner to set a goal, secure resources and to complete the corporation's profit goals.

- Knowledge of the Business. Familiar with the corporation's existence and the industry-wide issues that could impact profitability.
- Strategic Planning Experience. Knowledge of using financial criteria to project the opportunities and constants that the corporation must address to expand.
- Experience as a General Manager. A proven record of managing a large, complex organization.
- Financial Skills. Taking abstract numbers and applying real problem solving methods to increase productivity and profitability.
- Knowledge of a Particular Company. This is needed when the chief executive officer has more than one corporation to operate.
- Knowledge of Information Technology. The new chief executive officer must have experience with computers and analyzing data in a highly technological environment.
- Dealings with Government and External Groups. The future chief executive officer must be able to work in a highly bureaucratic and litigious society.
- Experience in Other Countries. The global economies almost mandate that the future chief executive officer knows about different nations and cultures.

Succession planning, when done well, saves time, effort and keeps the corporation on solid ground during the transition. But as Horton (1992) warns:

It is a rare succession that does not bring some disruption. One purpose of succession planning is to minimize that disruption to avoid organizational loss of momentum in the market. (p. 142)

Retirement was the most cited reason for the chief executive officer to leave the for-profit corporation. Succession planning is more for the future and well-being of the corporation than it is for the outgoing chief executive officer. The transition should be done with as little disruption as possible to meet the corporation's needs of forging ahead with their profit goals.

Summary

The findings of these empirical studies (see Appendix) about the reasons for turnover in the positions of superintendent of schools, executive directors of nonprofit agencies, and chief executive officers of for-profit corporations, suggest that the relationship these three have with their respective boards correlates with their tenure in their position. The superintendent will also leave to increase his or her salary and/or to move to a more prestigious or larger district. The executive director, who may be appointed to the nonprofit, not necessarily because of professional degrees or management skills, seems to be concerned with the relationship they have with the chairman of the board and obtaining another position while they are currently employed by the nonprofit organization. And, finally, a corporation is more concerned with the chief executive officer succession process and the corporation's well-being, not so much for the CEO. The most cited reason for the chief executive officer to step down is either voluntary or mandated retirement, but he or she usually emerges to sit on the

corporation's board of directors. Transitioning a new chief executive officer with as little disruption to the normal business functions of earning money for stockholders, offers stability and continued forward thinking of the for-profit business.

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Appendix
Studies of Turnover
by author, year and organization type

Author	Year	Organization Type
Achilles	1997	Education
Anthony and Young	1994	Nonprofit
Bennett, A.	1990	For-profit
Bennett, D	1991	Education
Bennis	1989	For-profit
Blumberg	1985	Education
Brady and Helmich	1984	For-profit
Carter and Cunningham	1997	Education
Carver	1990	Nonprofit
Carver	1997	Nonprofit
Chance and Capps	1990	Education
Chance and Capps	1992	Education
Chapman	1997	Education
Comte and Milal	1990	For-profit
Conway and Jacobson	1990	Education
Cuban	1976a	Education
Cuban	1976b	Education
Cuban	1988	Education
Daniels	1988	Nonprofit
Danzberger and Usdan	1994	Education
Dlugosh	1994	Education
Dlugosh	1997	Education
Douglas	1987	Nonprofit
Drucker	1990	Nonprofit
Eisenhart	1989	For-profit
Farrar	1990	Education
Finnegan	1990	For-profit
Friedman and Saul	1991	For-profit
Gabarro	1988	For-profit
Gelatt	1992	Nonprofit
Giles, S. and Giles, D. E.	1990a	Education
Giles, D. E., and Giles, S.	1990b	Education
Gordon	1997	Education
Grady and Bryant	1988	Education
Grady and Bryant	1991	Education
Graser	1972	Education
Hall	1987	Nonprofit
Harrison, et al.	1988	For-profit
Hay	1990	Nonprofit
Healy	1994	For-profit
Heim and Wilson	1982	Education
Henry	1987	Education
Herman and Heimovics	1994	Nonprofit
Horton	1992	For-profit
Jackson	1995	Education

Appendix Continued Next Page

Appendix Continued
Studies of Turnover
by author, year and organization type

Author	Year	Organization Type
Jacobson and Conway	1990	Education
Jacobson	1990	Education
James	1987	Nonprofit
Jay	1994	For-profit
Johnson	1988	Education
Kennedy	1991	Nonprofit
Kluger and Baker	1994	Nonprofit
Kowalski	1995	Education
Lawson	1991	Education
Lee and Milne	1988	For-profit
Lutz and Innaccone	1986	Education
Markello	1971	Education
Martin	1993	Nonprofit
Massarsky	1994	Nonprofit
Mehr	1980	Nonprofit
Mehr	1983	Nonprofit
Middleton	1987	Nonprofit
Miner	1967	Education
Moneith and Hallums	1989	Education
Moulton and Fickel	1993	For-profit
Murphy and Zimmermen	1993	For-profit
Nat. Com. Excellence in Ed.	1983	Education
Newman and Alexander	1985	For-profit
Nyberg	1990	Education
Osterman	1996	For-profit
Puffer and Weintrop	1991	For-profit
Renchler	1992	Education
Rinefort and Van Fleet	1998	For-profit
Sharp	1994	Education
Sharp and Walter	1997	Education
Sonnenfeld	1988	For-profit
Stieglitz	1985	For-profit
Sullivan-Kowalski	1976	Education
Sunoo	1998	For-profit
Temkin	1994	Nonprofit
Vancil	1987	For-profit
Vladeck	1988	For-profit
Warner, et al.	1988	For-profit
Webster	1985	Education
Weisback	1988	For-profit
Wernet and Austin	1991	Nonprofit
Winkler and Janger	1998	For-profit
Woods-Scherr	1997	Education
Yarrow	1989	Nonprofit
Yee and Cuban	1996	Education
Young	1985	Nonprofit
Young	1987	Nonprofit

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